Against Hermeneutical Gatekeeping: Or, How to Be a Materialist About (Some) Epistemic Injustices in Synthese (forthcoming).

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David Ludwig has argued that spending finite attentional resources on the question of how to achieve epistemic justice can contribute to sidelining the question of how to achieve material justice, even though achieving material justice is often most pressing. I respond to this ‘challenge of distorting agendas’ on behalf of work on epistemic injustices of two widely-discussed sorts, namely hermeneutical injustices and contributory injustices. I show that key is to recognize that many injustices of these sorts originate in practices of hermeneutical gatekeeping, by which I mean people’s access to needed goods being made contingent on their first rendering intelligible certain things about themselves. 

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Infrapolitical Strategies for Preventing Hermeneutical Injustices Amidst the Global Trans Panic in Ergo (forthcoming)​​.

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I argue that the anti-trans backlash of recent years has brought to the fore a number of limitations and previously unacknowledged downsides to the pursuit of previously proposed strategies for preventing hermeneutical ​​injustices. These strategies take for granted the interests people have in certain things about themselves being intelligible, and aim to enable them to satisfy these interests. I identify a novel kind of strategy that instead consists in doing away with certain of these interests, and so with the possibility of their unfair non-satisfaction. Crucially some strategies of this sort are infrapolitical, which I argue is an advantage in times of backlash.

I wrote a blogpost about this paper for New Work in Philosophy.

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Tackling Hermeneutical Injustices in Gender-Affirming Healthcare in Hypatia Vol.39 no.4 (2024), pp.688-710​​.

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Previously proposed strategies for preventing hermeneutical injustices all take for granted the interests people have in certain things about themselves being intelligible, and aim to enable them to satisfy these interests. I identify a novel kind of strategy that instead consists in doing away with certain of these interests, and so with the possibility of their unfair non-satisfaction. I argue that considerations of trust, privacy, and respect support the pursuit of such a strategy in the context of gender-affirming healthcare delivery.

I wrote a blogpost about this paper for the Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare Project.​

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Whose Hermeneutical Marginalization? in Episteme Vol.20 no.3 (2023) pp.813-832.

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I argue that people can suffer hermeneutical injustices without themselves belonging to the relevant hermeneutically marginalized group: for instance, men can suffer hermeneutical injustices as a result of women's hermeneutical marginalization.

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